America’s Big Mistake in Iran
When the United States and Israel launched the war on Iran in February, their plan was simple: bomb Iran until either the Iranian public rose up and overthrew the government, or the existing government capitulated to American demands. It rapidly became apparent that neither was going to happen. The Iranian people didn’t revolt against their oppressors. The Iranian government hunkered down, closed the strait, and gambled that the U.S. would be unwilling to invade or strike at crucial infrastructure.
TL;DR
- The US-Israel plan to bomb Iran relied on the assumption of public revolt or government capitulation, neither of which materialized.
- Historical theories advocating for airpower alone to win wars have consistently failed in practice, from World War II to Vietnam.
- Successful air campaigns often involved ground troops or the credible threat of invasion, as seen in Afghanistan and Serbia.
- A 1996 RAND study highlighted that airpower's coercive effectiveness depends on external factors, not just bombing.
- The US plan for Iran lacked these crucial external factors, dooming it from the outset.