China’s closest treaty ally is suddenly looking less predictable, and Xi Jinping’s rare trip to Pyongyang is as much damage control as it is celebration of “friendship.” The visit spotlights a three-way contest for influence over Kim Jong Un between Beijing, Moscow and Washington.

Liberal-leaning outlets frame the visit primarily as a defensive move by Beijing to shore up a fraying relationship. The Guardian stresses that Xi is seeking to “revitalise ties with his junior ally,” after trade collapsed during Covid and as Pyongyang forged “a much more recent history of military cooperation” with Russia, including thousands of North Korean troops in Ukraine and a new mutual defence pact with Moscow.¹ From this angle, Xi is not in command but scrambling to prevent “North Korea’s closeness with Russia” from outpacing ties with China.¹ CNBC similarly casts the trip as Beijing “testing its influence over a neighbor pulled increasingly into Russia’s orbit,” highlighting Xi’s promise of “unwavering” friendship while noting that North Korea now has “more leverage vis-a-vis China” thanks to deeper military ties with Moscow and advances in its nuclear program.²

Conservative coverage emphasizes symbolism and stability more than erosion of control. The Washington Times leads with Xi and Kim “expressing hopes for greater ties between China and North Korea,” and describes the summit as an effort to reassert Beijing’s “unique influence over its socialist neighbor,” not one among several competing patrons.³ A companion story dwells on Xi’s “colorful welcome” and the rareness of the visit, underscoring regime solidarity rather than strategic vulnerability.⁴

Where liberals see a volatile triangle in which Kim extracts concessions—possibly even “tacit recognition” of his nuclear status—from a nervous Beijing,² conservatives portray a choreographed reaffirmation of an old alliance. Both agree Xi is reasserting influence; they diverge on whether that looks like strength or anxious containment of a wayward partner.