Hungary’s new term-limit amendment has turned Viktor Orbán—the man long accused of hollowing out Hungarian democracy—into the test case for whether his successors will govern differently, or simply wield the same tools in reverse.

Hungary’s parliament, dominated by Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s Tisza party, passed a constitutional change capping any prime minister’s tenure at eight years, a move widely described as “blocking [the] possible return of Viktor Orban.”¹ The rule bars anyone who has already served eight years from running again, directly targeting Orbán, who led Hungary for 16 years and only just lost April’s election.¹

Supporters: A structural reset after an era of dominance

From a reformist and pro‑EU standpoint, the amendment is framed as part of a broader clean‑up. Magyar campaigned on an “anti-corruption and pro-European Union manifesto” and is using his two‑thirds majority to “roll back or change legislation passed by Orban, and alter the constitution.”¹ His allies argue that entrenched power distorted Hungary’s institutions and that hard term limits are a legitimate democratic safeguard rather than an exceptional measure.

Critics: ‘Lex Orbán’ and the weaponization of the constitution

Conservative and Orbán‑aligned voices depict the change as a personalized strike. One outlet bluntly characterizes it as a law “meant to prevent former Prime Minister Viktor Orban from returning to power,” dubbing it the “Orban law.”² Even Orbán joked that lawmakers had passed “the ‘Lex Orbán’” and promised, “If I am needed, I will be here.”²

Critics stress that “in practice, this is tailored to Viktor Orban, he is the only person this constitutional amendment applies to,” warning that “liberals preach democracy and apply legal means to exclude top challengers, instead of winning the argument and popular support.”² They also question whether the rule can be applied retroactively.²

A mirror image of past abuses?

The clash over term limits echoes a broader power struggle. Magyar is also moving against Orbán‑aligned President Tamás Sulyok, prompting Sulyok to accuse him of seeking “to rewrite the constitutional order solely for political reasons.”² For Orbán’s opponents, using constitutional tools to constrain him is overdue. For his supporters, it confirms a darker symmetry: the new government is learning Orbán’s methods all too well.