The proposed diplomacy around Ukraine presents a stark contradiction: a summit designed to end the war could also exclude the country bearing its costs.

A conservative-framed account presents the idea as a potential breakthrough, reporting that Vladimir Putin has floated a meeting with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping on ending the conflict.¹ That framing emphasizes the possibility of bringing the United States, Russia and China into a single negotiation, potentially creating a route around the war’s current stalemate.

The liberal account is more skeptical. It reports that Putin suggested the summit during an October 9 call with Trump and that, if held, it would not include Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The proposed venue could be the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, though the meeting remains unconfirmed.²

That difference is central. Supporters of the proposal can describe it as pragmatic great-power diplomacy; critics see the same structure as a settlement imposed over Ukraine’s head. The concern is sharpened by the broader pattern described in the liberal report: Washington has eased some pressure on Moscow, urged Kyiv to stop attacking Russian energy infrastructure and faced accusations that its policies are encouraging Ukrainian capitulation.²

Zelenskyy’s own assessment captures the danger. He said that “steps have been taken to convince Ukraine to capitulate” and warned that peace could be pursued “at Ukraine’s expense.”² Trump, by contrast, has defended sanctions relief as a way to keep Russia engaged, saying he did not want to “drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table.”²

Both perspectives treat negotiations as preferable to an open-ended war. They diverge over who should control the terms. A summit that excludes Kyiv might produce a headline agreement, but without Ukrainian consent it would risk turning peace diplomacy into another instrument of pressure.